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Abstract 
We explored the relationship between belief change and recollection of previous beliefs. 
Subjects reported beliefs about TV violence. Later, subjects read a one-sided, belief inconsistent 
text. We manipulated whether subjects reported beliefs after reading first, or recollected previous 
beliefs first. A third group was told their previous beliefs before reporting current beliefs. 
Recollections were not improved when subjects recollected beliefs first. When told previous 
beliefs, belief change was reduced, suggesting a desire to appear consistent. 
Keywords: text comprehension, beliefs 
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Belief Change and Memory for Previous Beliefs after Comprehension of Contentious Scientific 
Information 
There is no argument that people forget things over time. The longer the time-span, the 
more likely we are to forget. When we look at our own past, we reconstruct it through hindsight 
in light of our experiences that have taken place since the original memory. In the words of Ross 
& Conway (1986), “we forget, and we fill in the gaps in memory by inferring what probably 
happened” (p.123). This phenomenon holds true for people’s attitudes and beliefs. Attitudes can 
change gradually over time. Research has shown they may also change abruptly, in the face of 
convincing arguments (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Goethals & Reckman, 1973; McFarland & 
Ross, 1987; Levine, 1997; Ross, 1985). Additionally, this research has shown that when people 
change their attitudes, they incorrectly report their previous beliefs or attitudes as being similar 
to their newly formed attitudes (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Goethals & Reckman, 1973; 
McFarland & Ross, 1987; Levine, 1997; Levine, Lench, & Safer, 2009; Ross, 1985; Wolfe, 
2013). This bias in recall has been demonstrated for attitudes such as frequency of tooth brushing 
(Ross, McFarland, Fletcher, 1981), attitudes toward exercise (Ross, 1985), and bussing to 
achieve racial integration (Goethals & Reckman, 1973). Subjects in these studies reported their 
attitudes, then later experimenters manipulated their attitudes by instructing them to write 
counter-attitudinal essays or take part in a discussion with a confederate, who was given strong 
arguments against subjects’ original attitude and did most of the talking, before then reporting 
their new attitudes and being asked to recall their original ones. Individuals in all of these 
experiments consistently showed a change in attitude following the manipulation.  
Wolfe (2013) demonstrated the same effect among students studying scientific 
information about a contentious topic. Students who believed spanking was effective versus 
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ineffective read scientific texts that were inconsistent with their beliefs. Students changed beliefs 
following reading, and then overestimated the similarity between their original beliefs and their 
new ones.  
The relationship between current beliefs and recollection of previous beliefs is not well 
understood. Perhaps the most influential factor involved when we attempt to remember 
previously held beliefs is our present mental state. Not only is it most salient but also because we 
often assume such beliefs to be relatively stable over time unless there is an obvious reason that 
they should not be (Ross & Conway, 1986).  
Ross & Conway (1986) reason that when individuals attempt to reconstruct personal 
histories, they adopt implicit theories of either stability or change. What motivates us to adopt 
either theory is unclear and varies across contexts. In general, people are inclined to view 
themselves as consistent in their beliefs, abilities and personality (Ross & Conway, 1986). There 
is debate over the mechanism involved in this assumption of consistency. Cognitive dissonance 
creates a feeling of discomfort or embarrassment when an individual posses two or more 
contradictory beliefs (Festinger, 1957). Goethals & Reckman (1973) argue that knowledge of 
one’s own inconsistency of attitudes may induce cognitive dissonance. Individuals subsequently 
distort their recollection of past attitudes as to appear consistent with current beliefs in order to 
reduce this dissonance. This explanation requires individuals to assume consistency of attitudes 
however, as noted by Ross & Conway (1986), it also requires belief change to be salient to 
subjects for them alter their recollections. Biased memory for previous attitudes has also been 
interpreted as a product of impression management (Bem & McConnell, 1970). Similar to 
dissonance theory, impression management motivates individuals to appear consistent over time. 
Where this differs from the former is that the motivation stems from the impressions of others on 
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the individual rather than the subjects’ impression of themselves. However, neither is always the 
case in all attitude-manipulation experiments. In many of the experiments, including our own, 
the true purpose is disguised, and therefore subjects have no reason to believe they are being 
judged on the consistency of their attitudes, but rather the accuracy of their memory. We would 
assume subjects to be motivated toward performing well on tasks that they perceive are related to 
the purpose of the study. Therefore subjects may not experience dissonance just because their 
beliefs changed during the course of the study. Yet subjects in previous studies who change their 
attitudes are often unaware that they have changed and still assume cognitive temporal 
consistency (Ross & Conway, 1986).  
The present study attempts to shed light on these possible explanations. In this study, all 
subjects read a scientific text that is inconsistent with a prior belief the subject holds. We attempt 
to replicate Wolfe (2013) with a new topic, TV violence causing real aggression, and address two 
factors that may be involved in this relationship. First, stating a current belief may interfere with 
people’s ability to recollect previous beliefs. In previous research, current beliefs are stated 
before recollections. Stating a belief and then recalling how one felt earlier may be motivating 
subjects to recall past beliefs as similar to the current ones. If recollections are generated without 
interference from current beliefs, they may be more accurate. We address this possibility by 
manipulating the order that subjects state current vs. recollected beliefs. The first condition is 
similar to the typical recollection paradigm used by previous research where subjects’ beliefs are 
first manipulated, and then they give a rating of their current belief before recalling what they 
originally reported several weeks earlier. We add an additional condition where the order of 
reporting current belief and then recalling the original is reversed. Subjects in the second 
condition rate their beliefs in the topic of TV violence along with other filler topics, to serve as a 
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manipulation check, then are invited back later and presented with a text that is inconsistent with 
their belief on TV violence. We then ask them to first recall their original beliefs before asking 
them to rate their present beliefs. By comparing belief change and subsequent memory bias 
between these two conditions we will be able to examine first, whether we succeed in replicating 
the belief change phenomenon for TV violence and second, whether the act of explicitly stating a 
belief affects recollection more because the present attitude is more salient. If we find a 
difference between these two conditions, it would suggest that individuals are aware of belief 
change but alter recollections to appear consistent. 
 Second, the relationship between current and previous beliefs may be driven by a desire 
to appear consistent across time (Ross & Conway, 1986; Ross, 1989). People may experience 
dissonance after changing beliefs (Festinger, 1957). This dissonance may be resolved by altering 
the reporting of current or recollected beliefs so they appear similar. We address this possibility 
with a third condition where subjects are reminded of their previous belief before reporting their 
current belief. Rather than asking subjects to recall their earlier belief, we tell subjects what they 
reported and then ask them to rate their current belief. Since we are reminding subjects of their 
past beliefs, we cannot measure any bias in memory for these beliefs. We can, however, examine 
whether a desire for consistency will affect a belief change manipulation. If subjects desire to 
appear consistent, current beliefs after a reminder would be more similar to previous beliefs than 
when there is no reminder. For a more detailed representation of the present design, see figure 1. 
Our manipulations at time 2, for all conditions, of the order of post-belief report and 
recollections for the first two conditions as well as the reminder of pre-beliefs for the third 
condition are all presented in Figure 1. 
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 An additional goal is to address potential consequences of belief recollection errors. We 
examine the hypothesis that subjects who more accurately recollect that their beliefs have 
changed will be more interested in reading texts about this topic. The basic logic of this 
prediction is that if a subject has a large error in recollecting his or her previous beliefs, they may 
erroneously believe that their beliefs have not changed. In that circumstance, subjects may 
believe that reading new information on the same controversial topic will be unlikely to change 
their beliefs. In contrast, a subject who more accurately recollects that his or her belief has 
indeed changed may more likely be aware that their beliefs do change when they read new 
information. Under that circumstance, subjects may be more willing or interested in reading 
further information about the topic. We address this question with a task in which subjects rate 
their interest in reading a number of new articles, some of which are one-sided articles relating to 
our topic of television violence.  
Method  
Subjects 
One hundred sixty six subjects from a large Midwestern United States University 
participated. Subjects were selected based on their reported beliefs concerning television 
violence from a prescreening test at the beginning of the semester. One hundred sixty 
participated in exchange for partial credit in an Introductory Psychology course, and six received 
a ten-dollar gift card. Data from 16 subjects were discarded due to failure to follow directions or 
computer error. 
Materials 
Two texts were created that present one-sided arguments regarding the scientific literature 
related to the potential link between television violence and aggression. In the “TV Yes” text, 
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evidence is presented that suggests viewing television violence causes people to commit real 
violence. One section discusses how children are naturally predisposed to imitate adult behavior 
whether that behavior is appropriate or not. Two other sections discuss aggression in towns 
before and after television were introduced and longitudinal research. The text is 1,815 words 
with 19 paragraphs and has a Flesch-Kincaid grade level score of 11.7. The “TV No” text 
suggests that there is not enough evidence to make a causal conclusion about the link between 
television and actual violence. Some of the same research topics in the TV Yes text are discussed. 
Problems with the research and inconsistent findings are used to make a case that the causal link 
is inconclusive. The TV No text is 1,898 words with 19 paragraphs and has a Flesch-Kincaid 
grade level score of 10.6.  
The prior knowledge test consists of 20 4-option multiple-choice questions. The 
questions address terminology and basic research findings in media and violence research. The 
sentence recognition test utilized 60 sentences, with 30 taken from each text. For each text, every 
sentence was rated by a separate group of subjects on two dimensions: the extent to which the 
sentence supports the proposition and the extent to which the sentence refutes the proposition. 
Support and refute ratings were used in a different capacity for an earlier study by Wolfe et. al. 
(2013) and are on a continuous scale. In the present study, the ten sentences with the highest 
support ratings from each text were used as support sentences. The mean rating for the ten 
support sentences from the ‘TV Yes’ text was 7.64 and 7.23 for the ten from the ‘TV No’ text. 
The ten sentences with the highest refute ratings were used as the refute sentences. The mean 
rating for the ten refute sentences within the TV Yes text was 5.18 and 6.38 for the ten from the 
TV No text. Ten sentences that were neutral on both ratings were used as neutral sentences. The 
specific sentences that serve as target and distractors depend on which text is read. For each 
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subject, the sentences from the text read are targets (old), and the sentences from the other text 
are distractors (new). Each sentence can be characterized in terms of the extent to which it both 
supports and refutes the text position.  
The PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) is a sixty-item measure of emotional states. The 
PANAS-X measures positive affect and negative affect as general emotional states. The Need for 
Cognition (NFC) scale (Cacioppo, & Petty, 1982) is a measure of  “the tendency for an 
individual to engage in and enjoy thinking'' (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The NFC has eighteen 
items that the individual rates using a 9-point Likert-style scale.   
Belief change was measured by comparing the belief ratings of each subject, pre and post 
manipulation on the topic of TV violence and other filler topics, which we did not manipulate. 
Filler topics included homosexuality as a choice, spanking as disciplinary tool, and social 
media’s effect on relationships. Filler topics served as a manipulation check to ensure the texts 
used produced significant belief change. Ratings were measured using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 
9 (strongly agree), Likert-style scale. The difference between pre beliefs and post beliefs gave us 
a measure of belief change. For example if, in the prescreening, a subject responded to the 
statement “viewing television violence causes people to commit real violence” with 9 (strongly 
agree) but after manipulation reported 4 (moderately disagree) they have a belief change score of 
5. Recollection bias was measured by comparing recollection ratings to the original pre beliefs. 
For instance, if a subject rated their belief in the topic as 9 but their recollection were 5, we 
subtracted the original belief rating from the recollection to get a recollection bias rating of 4. 
Memory for the text content was assessed with a sentence recognition task. Recognition 
was measured using signal detection theory (Swets, 1964). d’ is a measure of subjects’ ability to 
discriminate sentences that were read from sentences that were not read. The logic of the test is 
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that subjects with better comprehension of the text will have a better ability to discriminate 
sentences they read from sentences they did not read. d’ was calculated separately for support, 
refute, and neutral sentences. Ten old and ten new sentences were used for each sentence type. 
Thus, there were a total of twenty support sentences; twenty refute sentences, and twenty neutral 
sentences. Position consistent sentences were supporting sentences within the ‘TV Yes’ text and 
refuting sentences in the ‘TV No’ text. Position inconsistent sentences were refuting sentences 
within the ‘TV Yes’ text and supporting sentences within the ‘TV No’ text.  
For the article-rating task, subjects rated their interest in reading each of twenty articles 
based on their titles using a Likert-style scale (1=not interested at all, 9=very interested). Of the 
twenty titles, three clearly support the proposition that viewing TV violence causes real violence 
(Watching Violence Makes for Angry Kids, Study Shows; TV Bloodbath: How Violent TV Makes 
Violent Teens; Media Violence: Why We Like it and Why it's Making Us so Violent) and three 
titles clearly refute the position: (Television and Violence: What We Watch Does Not Make Us 
Who We Are; Yes TV is Violent. But Does it Make us Violent? No; and Research Shows Violent 
Media do not Cause Violent Behavior). The remaining article titles address topics that are 
unrelated to Television violence and aggression. 
Procedure 
Subjects’ reported beliefs about TV violence effects as part of a prescreening survey 
within the first two weeks of the semester. The on-line survey was self-paced, and contained 
unrelated questions pertaining to other experiments. Subjects reported their belief in the 
proposition that viewing television violence causes people to commit real violence on a nine-
point scale (1 = “completely disbelieve”, 5 = “unsure whether I believe this”, and 9 = 
“completely believe”). Subjects who responded 1-3 on the belief scale were classified as 
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disbelievers and subjects who responded 7-9 were classified as believers. Believers and 
disbelievers were invited by email to sign up for the actual experiment. 
The experiment took place anywhere from 2 to 12 weeks after the on-line prescreening. 
All parts of the experiment were run individually at computer terminals, with up to four other 
subjects per session. Subjects began by completing the multiple-choice test. Subjects were 
assigned to read the text that was inconsistent with their belief on TV violence from the 
prescreening. Both texts were read one sentence at a time in a moving window fashion. The text 
appeared one paragraph at a time with all letters converted to dashes (-), except for the current 
sentence. Punctuation was maintained. Section titles appeared with the first paragraph of each 
section and were treated as separate sentences. Subjects were instructed to read each sentence 
until they understood it, and then press the spacebar. At that point, the current sentence turned 
back into dashes and the next sentence turned from dashes to text. After the last sentence of a 
paragraph, the first sentence of the next paragraph appeared as text with the rest of the paragraph 
as dashes. Following the text, subjects completed the PANAS-X and Need for Cognition scale to 
serve as a delay. 
Following the questionnaires, subjects were reminded of the responses they gave to 
statements in the prescreening. Subjects were told that the purpose of the reminder was to verify 
that their data had been correctly matched. An experimenter sat individually with the subject and 
read responses the subject reported on the prescreening. Subjects verified that the responses were 
ones they had reported. Subjects in both the current belief first and recollection first conditions 
verified seven responses including the filler topics that were unrelated to TV violence. Subjects 
in the previous belief given condition verified their responses to the same seven items and also 
verified their TV violence belief rating.   
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After completing the verification task, subjects reported current and recollected beliefs 
for TV violence and filler topics according to their condition. In the “current belief first” 
condition, subjects reported their beliefs and then recollected their previous belief from the 
prescreening. In the “recollection first” condition, this order was reversed. In the “previous belief 
given” condition, subjects only reported their current beliefs after being reminded of their 
responses in the verification task.   
Subjects next completed the sentence recognition task. Sixty sentences were presented 
one at a time, randomized for each subject. Instructions stated that subjects should decide if each 
sentence was presented word-for-word in the text they read. If so, they pressed a button labeled 
“old”, and if not, they pressed the “new” button. The task was self-paced. Next, subjects 
completed the article-rating task at their own pace. Titles appeared one at a time on the 
computer; subjects rated their interest in reading each article on a nine-point scale. Finally, 
subjects were debriefed and dismissed. 
Results 
We examined the extent to which reading a one-sided scientific text, which is inconsistent 
with an individual’s previously reported belief, affects subjects’ reporting of their current belief 
and the magnitude of recollection error when asked to recall the originally reported belief. Other 
questions we address are whether order effects of recollection and reported beliefs at time two or 
reminding subjects of their earlier beliefs impact these findings. We also investigated subjects’ 
interest in seeking new information as a consequence of belief change and recollection bias. 
Analysis of sentence reading times, Need for Cognition, and Positive/Negative Affect did not 
predict any belief change or recollection bias so we will not discuss them any further.  
 
BELIEF MEMORY BIAS 13 
Belief Change and Belief Memory Bias 
Belief ratings for half of the scores were flipped (i.e. scores of 1 were changed to 9, 2 was 
changed to 8, 3 to 7, and 4 to 6). It was not a goal of our study to distinguish believers from 
disbelievers and we did not anticipate there to be any significant differences between the two. 
Our concern was to assess the magnitude of belief change in both groups. By flipping half of the 
ratings, we were able to have a single, positive measure of belief change. Mean belief change 
and recollection bias scores for TV violence and filler topics within each condition are shown in 
Table 1. Belief change for the experimental topic of TV violence was significantly greater than 
for the filler topics. The mean belief change score for TV Violence was 2.73 among both groups 
compared to the filler topics that all had a mean belief change score of around 1 (see Table 1). 
The “post first” condition replicates Wolfe (2013). Subjects that reported beliefs then recollected 
previous beliefs had a mean belief change of 2.51 (Table 2). These recollections were more 
similar to current than previous beliefs. Mean recollection bias score within this condition was 
1.47. When the belief recollections were reported first, post beliefs and recollections were not 
significantly different than in the Post first condition. Mean belief change for recollection first 
was 2.73 and the mean recollection bias was 1.98 (Table 2). In both conditions, recollections 
were significantly different from pre beliefs, and similar to post beliefs. Multiple regressions 
assessed the variance in pre recollections that is accounted for by pre and post beliefs. In both 
conditions, post beliefs are a better predictor of pre recollections than the actual pre beliefs. In 
the post first condition, post beliefs accounted for significant variance in recollections over and 
above pre beliefs, partial r = .60, F (1, 40) = 23.15, p<. 0001. Pre beliefs did not significantly 
predict recollections, however, partial r = -.11, ns. In the recollection first condition, post beliefs 
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again accounted for significant variance in recollections, partial r = .42, F (1, 40) = 14.98, p<. 
0001. Pre beliefs did not significantly predict recollections, partial r = .15, ns.  
Reminders of Previous Beliefs 
Subjects who were reminded of their previous beliefs showed much smaller shifts from 
their original beliefs within in both texts. Mean belief change for subjects within this condition 
was 1.72 (Table 2). Table 1 clearly shows belief change as being significantly less for subjects 
who are reminded of pre beliefs before reporting new beliefs compared to the first two 
conditions. In the Pre belief given condition, belief ratings were significantly more similar to pre 
beliefs than in the two recollection conditions, F (1, 132) = 4.84, p = .03. 
Interest in Seeking New Information 
For article interest ratings, the mean of the three Yes and three No article titles were 
calculated. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 3, belief change from pre to post did not predict 
interest in Yes (r = -.06, ns) or No (r = -.09, ns) article titles. The magnitude of subjects’ 
recollection error, however, negatively correlated with interest in both Yes (r = -.22, p=. 04) and 
No (r = -.23, p=. 01) article ratings (see Figure 4). Ratings of Yes and No article titles were 
highly correlated (r=.77, p=.00).  As a result we combined both into a single scale and found that 
the magnitude of recollection error and the mean rating both position consistent and inconsistent 
article titles were negatively correlated (r=-.26, p=.01).  Thus, subjects who were more accurate 
in reporting that their beliefs had changed were more interested in reading articles that were both 
consistent and inconsistent with their previous beliefs.  
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Discussion 
We first replicated previous belief recollection bias findings (Goethals & Reckman, 1973; 
Levine, 1997; Levine & Safer, 2002; Ross, 1989; Wolfe, 2013), primarily the belief recollection 
error finding of Wolfe (2013) in scientific text comprehension. Subjects changed beliefs in the 
direction of the text position, and then misrecollected their previous beliefs. An important 
question we addressed in this study concerned the nature of this recollection bias. Two common 
explanations are that this is a product of a genuine memory error, meaning that recollections are 
made using the most currently available mental representation held by the subject (Levine & 
Safer, 2002; Ross, 1989) or that the bias is socially motivated by a desire to appear consistent 
(Gawronski & Strack, 2012).  
Implicit Theories of Stability 
The research of Ross (1989) suggests that individuals tend to assume their attitudes are 
consistent over time. Current beliefs bias our ability to accurately recollect earlier ones because 
people tend to view their attitudes and beliefs as things that are relatively stable across time. 
Even when beliefs change, individuals are not always aware that they have in fact changed, 
because they typically adopt an implicit theory of stability when reconstructing their past. So, 
when people base their current attitudes or beliefs on their current mental representation and 
available information, they tend to already harbor this theory of stability, which creates a bias in 
recollection. Even those who do not first state their new belief before remembering their earlier 
one still experience the same distortion of memory. We find supporting evidence that when 
beliefs change, it is not always salient to the subject. When subjects recollected their previous 
belief before reporting their post belief, recollection errors and current beliefs did not change 
compared to when post beliefs were reported first. It is not clear whether other circumstances 
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exist where recollection accuracy may be improved. Nevertheless, we have no evidence that 
recollection of previous beliefs can be improved compared to previous studies. 
Desire for Consistency 
Subjects who were reminded of their original belief reported significantly less of a 
change in their belief compared to the other two experimental conditions (Figure 2). This finding 
expands upon the understanding of belief change and recollection by suggesting that social 
factors affect explicit belief change in a way to appear consistent over time. When subjects were 
told their previous beliefs, they reported less belief change than when they were not. This result 
is consistent with a desire to appear consistent across time. However, further research is needed 
to rule out the possibility that providing previous beliefs merely serves as additional information 
that subjects have difficulty ignoring when reporting current beliefs. It may be that subjects 
experienced much less of a change in belief because the reminder of their previous belief was 
given to them orally from an experimenter. The presence of a presumed authority figure (an 
experimenter) to a naïve subject may induce are greater need to appear to be consistent as 
opposed to if subjects were simply reminded of their old beliefs by means of a computer prompt. 
We may see less of a difference of belief change if the subjects reported a discrepancy between 
their past and present attitudes anonymously. 
Consequences of Belief Memory Bias 
The article rating data provide an initial suggestion about the value of understanding 
when beliefs have changed. The high correlation of interest in both “Yes” and “No” article titles 
suggest that overall interest in any new information may be a predictor of belief memory bias 
magnitude. Students who were more accurate in their recollection of previous beliefs showed 
more of an interest in reading information that was both consistent and inconsistent with their 
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currently held beliefs (Figure 4). This suggests that those who are aware that their beliefs have 
changed may be more open to reading texts with a broader range of positions on contentious 
topics. Interest in seeking new information did not predict belief change however, so we cannot 
assume that those who are more likely to seek out new information change their beliefs any less 
than those who do not. The relationship between article interest and recollection bias does 
suggest that those with a desire to learn more about a subject are less likely to so quickly assume 
a stability mindset. Further research is needed to determine if perhaps the desire for new 
information can predict more or less change in attitudes and beliefs. Furthermore it would be 
interesting to investigate how social motivators such as impression management and cognitive 
dissonance may affect interest in seeking out new information, both consistent and inconsistent 
with how the subject feels at the present time. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Belief change and recollection bias among TV violence and filler topics. 
Topic Belief change (Std. Dev.) Recollection bias (Std. Dev.) 
TV violence*** 2.73 (1.91) 1.97 (1.67) 
Homosexuality .94 (1.18) .68 (1.05) 
Social media 1.01 (1.51) .90 (1.28) 
Spanking 1.03 (1.49) .77 (1.22) 
Note: Belief change and recollection bias measures were significantly higher for the topic of TV 
violence compared to the filler topics suggesting the manipulation did in fact cause subjects to 
shift their beliefs towards the text position. 
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Tables 
Table 2 
Belief change and recollection bias for TV violence among all three conditions after combining 
believers and disbelievers 
 Current belief first Recollection first Pre-belief given 
Belief change 2.51 2.73 1.72 
Recollection bias 1.47 1.98  
Note: Belief change for the current first and recollection first conditions did not differ 
significantly from each other. However, there is a significant difference of belief change for these 
two conditions compared to the pre-belief given condition. For a graphic representation of this 
data, see Figure 2. 
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Tables 
Table 3 
Belief change and recollection error correlations with article interest for Yes and No titles 
 “Yes” Title Ratings “No” Title Ratings 
Believers (No Text)   
Belief Change -.17 -.02 
Recollection Bias -.39* -.09 
Disbelievers (Yes Text)   
Belief Change .05 -.18 
Recollection Bias -.16 -.32 
Note: (*p<.05) Correlations between belief change and interest in article titles are not present. A 
significant correlation is present between recollection bias and article interest. Ratings of yes and 
no article titles were highly correlated (r=.77). As a result ratings were combined into a single 
scale that measured overall interest in seeking new information and correlated with magnitude of 
recollection bias (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 1. Visual diagram of all three conditions and their manipulations during time 2 following 
the belief inconsistent text. Orders of recollection and reporting new belief are manipulated for 
the first two conditions and a reminder of previous beliefs are given to the third condition. 
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Figure 2. Belief change and recollection bias scores for each condition. Believers (“Yes” text) 
and disbelievers (“No” text) have been combined so data is separated by condition rather than by 
text read. No significant difference of belief change or recollection bias is shown between the 
first two conditions. However, a significant difference for belief change between the first two 
conditions and subjects who were reminded of their earlier belief is present. 
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Figure 3. No significant correlation is present between mean article interest rating and magnitude 
of belief change. 
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Figure 4. Magnitude of article interest for both yes and no article titles correlated with magnitude 
of recollection error between both post-belief first and pre-belief first conditions (r=-.27, p=.01). 
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